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Abstract: This paper adopts a radical contextualist approach to the reference of definite 
descriptions that contain the English expression the same, either without a complement 
or with a complement in the form of a head noun and/or a comparison phrase of the 
type as X. It is argued that definite descriptions which contain the same do not refer to a 
unique entity, despite the fact that the result of a comprehension test carried out seems 
to give some support to the belief that such descriptions may serve the function of a 
directly referring term.
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Resum: Aquest article adopta un enfocament radicalment contextualista en relació amb 
la referència de descripcions definides que contenen l’expressió anglesa the same, tant 
sense complement com amb complement en forma de nucli nominal i/o de sintagma 
comparatiu del tipus as X. S’argumenta que les descripcions definides que contenen 
the same no fan referència a una entitat única, encara que el resultat de la prova de 
comprensió efectuada sembla donar suport a la idea que aquestes descripcions poden 
afavorir la interpretació que aquests sintagmes definits es refereixen directament a una 
entitat específica.
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1. Same – syntactically a definite determiner, semantically  
a predicate 
Syntactically, the English word same is an adjective-like, pre-nominal 
determiner (Det) occurring exclusively in definite Determiner Phrases 
(DPs). This syntactic property is shared by its counterparts in sever-
al other languages, including French (même), Spanish (mismo), Por-
tuguese (mesmo/mesma), and Italian (stesso/stessa). Written German 
even incorporates the definite article in the sameness Det, i.e. dersel-
be, dieselbe, dasselbe, where -selbe is a cognate of English self. In the 
Scandinavian languages, a DP that contains samme/same/samma/sama 
(same) is syntactically definite even when there is no overt expression 
of the definite article (or a demonstrative Det) in the phrase. A Scan-
dinavian adjective inserted between the similitude Det and the head N 
requires the so-called weak form indicative of definiteness. The weak 
form is triggered by the similitude determiner, so the DP is grammati-
cally definite even if it contains no adjective and no other sign of defi-
niteness than the word that looks deceptively like a cognate of English 
same1.
Semantically, same does not behave like a typical Det in an attrib-
utive position before a head N2. Its semantic function is that of a two-
place predicate on a par with regular similitude adjectives like similar 
(to), identical (to), equal (to) and the verb equal. The two arguments 
of this predicate frequently denote something abstract, in accordance 
with the following formula: What X did/said is the same as what Y did/
said, and there is a tendency for the head N after same to be omitted 
when it represents a discourse-given entity, especially when the two 
arguments compared are abstract entities. Example (1), a passage from 
the Norwegian author Jostein Gaarder’s novel Sofies Verden (Sophie’s 
World), 1991, illustrates this. It presents first the author’s original Nor-
1 English same is a actually loan from Old Norse. It does not exist in Old English, which 
used ilca to express ʻthe same’. Same only appears in Middle English around 1200 a.d. 
(Leiv Egil Breivik p.c.).
2 This discrepancy between syntactic structure and semantics amounts to a violation 
of the Isomorphism Principle originally attributed to Frege (1923). The idea is that 
isomorphism exists between the syntactic constituents of a sentence S and the corre-
sponding constituents of the proposition P that S expresses.
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wegian text with interlinear glosses and then the respective English and 
German translations of it. 
(1) Jenta       i   speilet         svarte     ikke med så mye som en liten grimase.
 [girl.Def in mirror.Def]i answered not with as much as a small grimace 
 Uansett  hva Sofie gjorde, gjorde hun akkurat det samme. Norwegian 
source
 regardless what Sophiej did did      shei exactly the same 
→ The girl in the mirror did not react with as much as a twitch.  
 Whatever Sophie did, she did exactly the same. English target 
→ Das Mädchen im Spiegel schnitt als Antwort nicht einmal die kleinste 
Grimasse.
 Egal, was Sofie auch machte, sie machte genau dasselbe. German tar-
get
No extra information would have been transmitted if a comparison 
phrase were added after det samme, the same, or dasselbe, a phrase 
that mentions Sophie. This covert referent in the final clauses in (1) is 
just as easily retrievable as if there had been an as-phrase complement 
there (the same as Sophie). The countenance of the girl in the mirror is 
compared to Sophie’s own visage, in this case an inevitable similarity.
Section 2 explores how English DPs with the Det same differ in 
form and how the syntactic variation impacts on the addressee’s prag-
matic processing of the utterance, with a focus on the reference of the 
truth-conditionally equivalent arguments of the similitude predicate. 
Section 3 is the central part of the paper. It addresses the question 
whether a definite description that contains same can ever be used as a 
directly referential term. The position I shall defend is that same blocks 
a referential reading of definite DPs, in any context. Native English 
judgments emerging from a comprehension test suggest, at first glance, 
that a DP modified by same may in fact be used as a directly referring 
term, while other data seem to show that this is a false impression. Spe-
cial attention will be given to the pragmatic consequences of the con-
trast between a same-modified DP with, and one without, a complement 
in the form of a comparison phrase starting with the connective as. Two 
definite descriptions occurring in the set of talk exchanges included in 
my test data – the same hotel as Peter and the same hotel without a 
comparison phrase – appear to refer to a unique object, Hotel Excelsior, 
and more strongly so in some exchanges than in some others. Despite 
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appearances, it will be argued that these DPs should be analyzed as 
non-referential, descriptive terms. They do not direct the addressee to 
a unique singular referent at the explicitly communicated level of con-
tent. Some theoretical consequences of my analysis are expressed in the 
final Section 4.
2. The possible syntactic environments of the same and their 
pragmatic consequences
Same can appear as a pre-N determiner in a DP whose definite form the 
same is accompanied by a zero complement3 that needs to be saturated 
(e.g. Recanati 2010) by a pragmatic process of conceptual transfer from 
a discourse antecedent4, or it may be followed by a complement in the 
3 My formulation “accompanied by a zero complement” should be read as a meta-
phorical expression. I do not believe there to be a syntactically real null element there. 
Sentences like They are the same, John experienced the same and The same is true of 
her brother are grammatically complete. A token of same that is not accompanied by 
a following head N and a comparison phrase (as NP) triggers the hearer’s pragmatic 
search for a contextually determined concept whose linguistic counterpart could have 
occupied the head N position as well as a search for the contrastive, opposite member 
of the similitude relation that could have been realized linguistically as a comparison 
phrase. An addressee must infer the reference of these unexpressed items in order to 
form a mental representation of a truth-evaluable proposition. These linguistically cov-
ert objects may be subsumed under Perry’s category of “unarticulated constituents” 
(Perry, 1986; Crimmins & Perry, 1989; Crimmins, 1992; Korta & Perry, 2011). Stanley 
(2000) perceives such unarticulated logical constituents as syntactically real variables, 
while Recanati (2004, 2010) and the relevance theorists view them as the result of 
context-dependent pragmatic enrichment. This implies that a token of same causes the 
addressee to look for, and draw inferences about the identity of, the contrastive member 
of the similitude relation, in case there is no linguistic trace of it.
4 Instead is a function word with a similar semantic property (Fretheim, 2017), and so 
is the comparison marker rather (than). The contrast between the alternative chosen 
and the alternative rejected is an integral part of the semantics of instead. When the 
discarded option is not overtly expressed, the addressee will handle it as a zero com-
plement of instead, a complement whose conceptual meaning must be retrieved via a 
pragmatic saturation process. For example, a given utterance of the sentence Peter put 
his bag in a locker instead must be enriched in such a way that the explicit content, or 
explicature (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995), of the utterance answers the question of 
what alternative was discarded and replaced by the decision to place the bag in a locker. 
Similarly, the contrast between a preferred and a dispreferred alternative is an integral 
part of the semantics of rather, as in the sentence I would rather wait here, where the 
covert, dispreferred alternative must be retrieved via a pragmatic search for a discourse 
Thorstein Fretheim202
form of a comparison phrase starting with as. A third option is to embed 
a restrictive relative clause in a complex DP starting with the same N, 
as in (2).
(2) Karen went to the same store that Neil had recommended. 
When a restrictive relative is embedded in a definite DP that con-
tains same, the semantic contribution of this word seems to be quite 
modest. Even (3), identical to (2) except for the missing determiner 
same, informs the hearer that the store that Karen visited was the (same) 
store that Neil had recommended. According to the analysis to be de-
fended in this paper, one difference between (2) and (3) is that, while 
(3) may be used in an act of singular reference to a unique store, the DP 
with the same in (2) does not pick out a particular entity. The proposi-
tion expressed in (2) tells us that the store visited by Karen is the same 
as the store that Karen was recommended by Neil, but the name of that 
store or any further information about it is extraneous to the explicitly 
communicated proposition.
(3) Karen went to the store that Neil had recommended.
While omission of a token of the same in the head of a restrictive 
relative clause does not change the speaker’s truth-evaluable content, 
the presence of the connective as in the comparison phrase as Neil in 
(4) makes same a mandatory item. 
(4) Karen went to the same store as Neil. 
The explicitly communicated content of an utterance of (4) con-
forms to the following paraphrase: ʻThe store that Karen went to is the 
same as the store that Neil went to’, while (2) may be paraphrased as 
ʻThe store that Karen went to is the same as the store that Neil had rec-
ommended’. (2) tells us why Karen went to a particular store, without 
referring to that place. (4) tells us that Karen and Neil both paid visits to 
one particular store, again without referring to it. 
antecedent that makes the linguistic stimulus relevant. Unlike same (as), the connec-
tives instead (of) and rather (than) never assume the function of a predicate; they are 
adverbial adjunctions.
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Frege’s “sense”, or “Sinn” in his original German text (Frege 1892), 
is a “mode of presentation” of the referent (Frege’s “Bedeutung”) of a 
singular term that illuminates a single aspect of the referent as truth-con-
ditional constituent of the proposition expressed. Wettstein (1991) in-
troduced the term “cognitive fix” on a referent, saying that, “One’s 
ʻcognitive fix’ on an object is how one thinks of it, in a broad sense of 
ʻthinking’”. A speaker’s expressed cognitive fix on a particular referent 
is typically rather volatile; it will change from one occasion to another, 
depending partly on what the speaker believes to be information shared 
by speaker and hearer at the time of utterance, information that hope-
fully makes it maximally easy for the hearer to identify the referent. 
This could be background information of a contextualizing sort, often 
ad hoc description of the referent that could not have been expressed by 
means of an indexical. The present paper is an attempt to demonstrate 
that the appearance of same, in data like (2) and (4), guarantees that 
the respective DPs in those sentences are used as non-referential terms. 
Because the descriptions differ, the truth-conditional contents of (2) and 
(4) differ. 
True enough, both (2) and (4) may cause the addressee to think of 
one particular singular referent, in a context shared by speaker and 
hearer, a unique place that Karen visited, say the BHS store in the center 
of Lonsfield. Still, the definite descriptions in the two sentences do not 
designate this particular store at the explicit level of communication. 
While the DP in (3) may or may not be used referentially to pick out, 
say, that BHS store in Lonsfield, the addressee’s association of the DPs 
in (2) and (4) with a unique singular referent would be a pragmatic 
effect of a conversational implicature (Grice, 1989, specifically Part 1 
entitled Logic and Conversation). For radical contextualists (e.g. Sper-
ber & Wilson, 1986/1995; Carston, 1988, 2002; Bezuidenhout, 2002; 
Recanati, 2004, 2010), an implicature is a communicated thought that a 
hearer activates wholly on the basis of inference. Inference drawn from 
the explicit content of (2) on the one hand and (4) on the other hand 
may point to the same implicated information that Karen went to the 
BHS store. The radical contextualist tenet is that sentence meaning gen-
erally underdetermines not only the speaker’s meaning but also more 
narrowly what is said. Grice, in contrast, drew a theoretical distinction 
between what is said, i.e. explicit content, and all sorts of implicatures, 
and did not permit pragmatic inference to interfere with what is said (cf. 
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neo-Gricean literature represented, among others, by Levinson, 2000; 
Horn, 2007; Huang, 2015). 
No matter whether you are a radical contextualist or a neo-Gricean, 
there is no context in which the truth-evaluable proposition expressed 
by an utterance of (4) above can be the same as the proposition ex-
pressed by an utterance of (2). What is said in (2) and in (4) is not that 
Karen went to the BHS store in Lonsfield, even if that may be exactly 
what happened and also information that the interlocutor cannot help 
deriving inferentially at the time of utterance. If the BHS store in Lons-
field had been the occasion-specific referent of the prepositional objects 
of (2) and (4), then an utterance of (2) would have expressed the same 
explicature as an utterance of (4). That thought does not ring true.
In (5), there is no overt mention of the person who did something 
similar to what Karen did, like the man called Neil in (2)–(4), or, in a 
different context, no mention of a time in the past when Karen visited 
the (same) store. 
(5) Karen went to the same store.
If the communicated similarity concerns what Karen did and what 
someone else did, then the hearer must make a context-driven, inferen-
tial search for the covert argument of the two-place similitude predicate 
SAME, hence most typically for the unmentioned human referent con-
trasting with the referent Karen. Consider the talk exchanges between A 
and B in (6), where B1, B2 and B3 are meant to be disjunctive reactions 
to A’s utterance.
(6) A: Neil went to the BHS store next to the market place in Lonsfield.
 B1: Karen went to the same store. 
 B2: Karen went to the same store as Neil.
 B3: Karen went to that store as well. 
Are B1–B3 truth-conditionally equivalent utterances in the context 
of A’s statement? In other words, do the DPs the same store in B1 and 
the same store as Neil in B2 refer directly to the same object as A’s 
lengthy DP and the coreferential DP that store in B3? The DPs in B1 
and B2 need a nuclear accent, on same or on store. The newness (in-
formation focus) of the utterances of B1 and B2 is the information that 
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the store visited by Karen is (the same as) the store visited by Neil. B2 
in particular does not seem to commit speaker B to the belief that the 
store was the one described by speaker A; what we know for sure is just 
that Karen’s store and Neil’s store were the same. In B3, however, the 
complex demonstrative that store needs to be de-accented because it is 
coreferential with the DP in A’s declarative. The focus marker as well 
in B3 relates to the subject nominal Karen, and the predicate comple-
ment there is truth-conditionally the same as the one in A’s utterance. 
If there was likewise a truth-conditional identity relation between A’s 
predicate phrase and the predicate phrases in B1 and B2, one would le-
gitimately expect the focus marker as well to be a suitable addition in 
those sentences too. However, the presence of same in B1–B2 appears 
to be incompatible with the focus marker, which is arguably a sign that 
the predicate phrases in those sentences do not express the same con-
tent as the predicate phrase in A’s utterance. The DPs in B1 and B2 des-
ignate the store that Neil and Karen visited, regardless of how that store 
was described by A, whereas the DP in B3 refers directly to the BHS 
store described in a uniquely identifiable way by speaker A. That Karen 
went to that store is implicated in the case of B2, but is that information 
just implicated even in B1? In case one is inclined to interpret the short-
er predicate phrase in B1 differently than the longer predicate phrase 
in B2, the longer form with the as-phrase gives the addressee an input 
to the inferential phase of utterance interpretation that differs from the 
way that the alternative without the as-phrase affects the addressee’s 
pragmatic derivation of the content of the utterance. If B1 and B2 are 
not truth-conditionally equivalent expressions in (6), then it is pertinent 
to ask why the linguistic difference between the two DPs matters. 
The pragmatic inference that directs the addressee’s attention to a 
unique person who went to the same store as Karen is input to a men-
tal process of context-driven conceptual enrichment (Sperber & Wilson 
1986/1995). This is a pragmatic enrichment that takes us from the con-
textually invariant meaning of (6) B1 to a mental representation with 
two contrasted referents, Karen and Neil. The latter referent does not 
belong to the encoded logical form of B1 but it is overtly expressed in 
B2. If the DPs in sentence B1 can be pragmatically enriched in two, or 
more, distinct ways, leading to distinct mental representations of speak-
er B’s alternatives B1 and B2, then it is incumbent on linguists with an 
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interest in the gap between sentence meaning and speaker meaning to 
try to account for what is going on in such linguistic pairs. 
When the grammatical subject has a plural form, the individual ref-
erents of the plural subject nominal – a plural definite description, a 
plural personal pronoun or a set of conjoined noun phrases – share one 
specified property that is predicated of them all. Then the hearer’s in-
ferential processing does not have to involve saturation of a zero com-
plement of the same. An utterance of (7), with all as a floating universal 
quantifier, may be relevant even if the explicit truth-conditional content 
of the utterance does not include information about how the individual 
members of the set of subject referents are the same, that is, what the 
identity consists in.
(7) They are all the same5.
It is acceptable to produce a stimulus like (7), with the DP the same 
after a copula predicate, even if the hearer has not yet been told in what 
respect the speaker is judging the individual referents of the pronoun 
they to be similar. That information may be disclosed in a forthcoming 
utterance. What we know for sure, regardless of contextual input, is that 
all individual members of the set designated by the 3rd person plural 
pronoun share one attribute that is relevant to the topic of discourse. 
The pronoun they in (8), a quantifier-free sentence but otherwise 
identical to (7), is probably a bit more likely to represent just one of the 
arguments of the similitude predicate. 
(8) They are the same. 
The other argument could have been expressed overtly in a compar-
ison phrase introduced by the connective as, but this other argument is 
linguistically suppressed by the speaker of (8), so it must be identified 
5 The illformedness of *They are (all) same shows that same is not a predicative adjec-
tive, unlike the near-synonymous adjectives identical, similar and equivalent, as well 
as the adjective alike, which only occurs in a predicative position. Like former, latter, 
preceding, following and late in the sense of “deceased”, the identity marker same is 
invariably in a pre-N position in the DP. 
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through a pragmatic process of enrichment triggered by some element 
in the sentence used, here the word same6. 
The same one in (9), with the overt pro-N one, represents a particular 
token of something, not a general concept as in (8). 
(9) They are the same one. 
It is not the pronominal head N one alone that is responsible for the 
expression of identity between members of a set of seemingly distinct 
things designated by the pronominal subject they. What matters is the 
combination of grammatical definiteness and one7. The DP the same one 
in (9) constrains the range of possible pragmatic interpretations more 
than what the same in (8) does. There are possible worlds in which an 
utterance of (8) would be true but an utterance of (9) would be false. 
A token of (8) could mean that the individual referents of the plural 
personal pronoun they share one specific attribute with respect to which 
they are being compared, though they may differ in other respects. (9), 
however, means more than that the objects designated are identical in 
terms of one or more properties. What may look like different objects 
is the same object. For instance, a single object may have been photo-
graphed from different angles and in such a way that you get the visual 
impression that the photos represent distinct objects. 
In the attested example (10), the predicate carried on interacts posi-
tively with the overt comparison phrase as before appearing post-nom-
inally in the complex DP the same manner as before. The author is 
comparing two temporally distinct stages of a single communicative 
event. Christoff’s performance in the first phase of his speech is being 
compared to his performance at a later stage.
(10) Christoff carried on with his argument, a slight tension in his voice, but 
otherwise in much the same manner as before.
 (Kazuo Ishiguro: The Unconsoled, 1995, p. 197)
6 Because of the contrast between the referent of they and the referent to be retrieved 
inferentially, they is likely to be a contrastively accented pronoun when it represents 
just one of the contrasted arguments of the similitude predicate.
7 When the form of the DP is indefinite, the pro-form one points to a general concept, 
and is required in the head N position if the nature of the denoted type of object is not 
specified. The general concept denoted by a discourse antecedent will then saturate the 
pro-form one (cf. I bought a new one vs. *I bought a new).
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(11) is from the same novel by Kazuo Ishiguro8.
 After all, they said to me, all that’s required is to impress on the guests 
something of the true nature of our work. Two bags or three, the effect 
would be much the same. I should reduce my minimum to two suitcases 
and no harm would be done. I accepted what they said, sir, but I know 
it’s not quite the truth. I can see it doesn’t have nearly the same effect 
when people look at me.
 (Kazuo Ishiguro: The Unconsoled, 1995, p. 8)
The narrator who is sharing his thoughts with someone in (11) is 
Gustav, an old porter in a hotel, and the pronoun they refers to his col-
leagues. There are two instances of the same in (11). The first occur-
rence is in a sentence in which the author is using free indirect speech 
(oratio tecta) in order to metarepresent a thought attributed to Gustav’s 
porter colleagues. A context-dependent enrichment of the statement the 
effect would be much the same is something like the following: ʻThe 
positive effect upon guests would be much the same if I carried no more 
than two bags as if I go on carrying those three bags that I normally car-
ry’. Gustav’s own belief is that there is indeed a significant difference, 
from this veteran porter’s perspective, between a guest’s seeing a porter 
laden with two bags and seeing one laden with three bags. The second 
occurrence of the same in (11) is functionally almost a replica of the 
first one, except that this time it is Gustav’s own opinion we hear, not 
the metarepresented voice of his colleagues. Gustav is now explicitly 
rejecting the thought that the difference between carrying three bags at 
a time and carrying no more than two is unimportant. People’s reactions 
to the heavier load is such that he feels they respect him more then than 
when his load is a mere two bags. The referent of the anaphoric pro-
noun it in the sentence I can see it doesn’t have nearly the same effect 
8 The very sentence that you just read contains what may be likened to an anaphoric zero 
variable after the complex DP the same novel by Kazuo Ishiguro. The explicitly com-
municated content is that the text fragment in (11) is from the same novel by Ishiguro 
as the fragment in (10). Readers of this sentence have contextual knowledge sufficient 
to derive the information that the novel is the one entitled The Unconsoled, but that 
information is solely due to inference, because the same novel by Kazuo Ishiguro is, at 
least according to the analysis presented in this paper, not a directly referential term. At 
the explicit level, the sentence means that the novel that the excerpt in (11) belongs to 
is the same as the novel which (10) belongs to. The explicit content (explicature) does 
not involve the title of the novel. 
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when people look at me is ʻmy carrying two bags instead of three’, and 
the same effect has to be enriched as ʻthe same effect as if I had carried 
three bags’, or possibly ʻthe same effect as when I carry three bags’, 
without counterfactivity. 
In (12), which is extracted from the bidirectional translation cor-
pus OMC (the Oslo Multilingual Corpus), the fact that the narrator had 
made a disappointing decision in her life is not asserted, it is presup-
posed. Here, as in example (2) above, the word same makes a very 
modest contribution to relevance, compared to its importance in (11) 
and in other data presented above.
(12) If it lay within her power, Yvette would never have to make the same 
disappointing decision that she herself had made. 
 (Anita Brookner: Latecomers, 1988)
The 3rd person narrator in (12) is a woman named Martine, here re-
ferred to by means of the pronominal forms her, she and herself. Yvette 
is Martine’s daughter, and Martine dreads that Yvette will make the 
same unfortunate decision in her life that Martine herself had made. 
The meaning would be essentially the same if same were dropped. Its 
function in (12) is not that of a two-place predicate at the explicit level 
of content. No other decision than Martine’s own is mentioned. We fail 
to discern two distinct, compared arguments here. Even if same is erad-
icated, one understands that Martine’s fear is that Yvette might at some 
point in her life repeat her mother’s regrettable decision. (12), with the 
determiner same in the complex DP with the embedded restrictive rela-
tive clause, conveys no more than that. 
(13a) is an English target text found in the OMC, a translation of 
Norwegian (13b). The English translation starts with a singular mas-
culine possessive pronoun, his, an anaphor that points backwards to 
a singular masculine antecedent, and the head N son reveals that the 
linguistic antecedent phrase can only refer to the father of this son. The 
trade of the son was the same as the trade that his father had chosen 
many years earlier. In the Norwegian source text of (13b), there is no 
linking possessive pronoun but the intended explicature is just as unam-
biguously expressed there as in the English translation9.
9 Possessive pronouns with the function of a pre-nominal determiner are quite often left 
out in Norwegian, and this happens very frequently when the head N is a kinship term.
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(13) a. His son began in the same trade ….
  (from the Norwegian novelist Gunnar Staalesen’s novel I Mørket er 
Alle Ulver Grå, 1983, translated by David McDuff, 1986, with the 
title At Night All Wolves are Grey)
 b. Sønnen begynte i samme faget, ...
  son.Def began in same trade.Def
  (Staalesen’s source text)
In (14b), the word samme appears in the Norwegian source text but 
there is scarcely a trace of it in the English target text of (14a), with the 
exception of the translator’s use of a clause introduced by the compari-
son connective as, the English counterpart of the connective som in the 
source text. 
(14) a. “You can trust us as you trust your own children, Mr. McElroy, sir.”
  (from Joan Tate’s translation of Erik Fosnes Hansen’s novel Salme 
ved Reisens Slutt/Psalm at Journey’s End)
 b. “De kan ha samme tiltro til oss som til Deres egne barn, Mr. McElroy, 
sir.”
  you can have same trust to us as to your own children ….
  (Fosnes Hansen’s source text)
English (14a) and Norwegian (14b) communicate the same expli-
cature. The absence of the word same in (14a) does not stop us from 
construing the linguistic form as an expression of similarity betwen two 
abstract objects, that is, ʻThe degree to which you can trust us is the 
same as the degree to which you can trust your own children’. This ap-
plies to English (14a) no less than to the source text of (14b), although 
the similarity betwen the two eventualities compared is only signaled 
by the connective as in the English target text. What made it possible 
for the English translator Joan Tate to drop the word same is her choice 
of the verb trust. Use of an English noun that corresponds directly to 
the Norwegian noun tiltro, something like confidence or the noun trust, 
would obviously have demanded the presence of the Det same before 
the head noun.
(15) is a translation of a Norwegian text fragment found in the same 
novel as (13). Here the word same occurs in an elliptical linguistic form, 
a sentence fragment which tells us that two points on the time scale are 
being compared, but neither of them is overtly expressed. Both argu-
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ments of the similitude predicate have to be inferred on the basis of 
contextual evidence. 
(15) “Why don’t we meet again tomorrow in the café and I’ll tell you about 
it then.”
 I got up.
 It was a heavy burden to lift and the floor felt like quagmire underneath 
me.
 “Same time?”
 (Gunnar Staalesen: At Night All Wolves are Grey)
Reading (15), we infer that the question Same time? means the same 
as Same time tomorrow as today?. Although neither one of the contrast-
ed dates is overtly expressed in the elliptical form Same time?, we do 
not fail to infer that the arguments of the similitude predicate are the 
time of our meeting tomorrow and the time of our meeting today, i.e. 
the day on which the conversation between the 1st person narrator and 
his antagonist took place. One pertinent question is whether the prop-
ositional form pragmatically derived from the request for information, 
Same time?, contains a reference to a mutually known time of the day, 
so that it could have been replaced, salva veritate, by, say, the question 
Nine p.m.?, in case that was when they met on the day of utterance. This 
would mean that the term same time is used referentially as opposed to 
descriptively, or attributively (e.g. Recanati 1993). The question wheth-
er a definite DP modified by same can ever function like a directly ref-
erential term will be addressed and examined in full in the next section.
3. Is the presence of same in a definite DP consistent with direct 
referentiality? 
How do we distinguish between possible referential versus non-ref-
erential uses of definite descriptions that contain the word same? Are 
there any disambiguating formal criteria? Is a DP with same in it ever of 
the (directly) referential sort? My answer is that same blocks referential 
use, in spite of the fact that certain data, to be considered presently, 
seem to support the opposite conclusion.
Consider first the invented talk exchange between two interactants A 
and B in the adjacency pair of (16). 
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(16) A:  Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.
 B:  Penny was staying in the same hotel.
Is speaker B saying explicitly that Penny was staying in Hotel Ex-
celsior? Or does B’s response only commit B to the belief that Penny 
was staying in the same hotel as Peter, the result of pragmatic enrich-
ment based on retrieval of the other member of the sameness relation, 
via inference based on the content of A’s statement about Peter? While 
Hotel Excelsior is a referring expression used referentially in A’s utter-
ance, it is far from obvious that B’s term the same hotel refers to Hotel 
Excelsior. The same in (16) B does not function in the same way as 
the demonstrative Det that of that hotel in (17) B, an indexical whose 
semantic value is transferred from A’s referential term Hotel Excelsior. 
(17) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.
 B: Penny was staying in that hotel. (= She was staying in Hotel Excelsi-
or.)
 
In contrast to that hotel in (17), the same hotel in (16) is a descrip-
tion that uniquely picks out one hotel which, according to B, was the 
temporary residence of both Penny and Peter10. That Penny was staying 
in the hotel referred to by A does not necessarily mean that the name 
given to it by A is correct. We can imagine that B proceeds to tell A 
subsequent to (16) that its name is not Excelsior. Alternatively, B may 
believe that Penny and Peter were staying in the same hotel, without 
also sharing with A the belief that it was Hotel Excelsior. B could think 
it was a different hotel. Unlike (16), (17) B does not permit that inter-
pretation. More will be said about these contrasts in what follows11. 
10 Their respective stays there may have coincided in time, or they may have been 
temporally disjoint. However, the continuous tense was staying, in contradistinction to 
stayed, supports the simultaneity reading, which suits my purpose. 
11 I should add here that it was pointed out to me by one anonymous reviewer that the 
Det same and the Det that may cooccur in a DP. I have used the contrast between that N 
and the same N to illustrate the difference between a definite term that is used referen-
tially and one that is used non-referentially, respectively, but what about that same N? 
Does the lexical semantics of same override the procedural meaning of the anaphoric 
demonstrative that in such phrases? I have no fixed opinion about how to deal with the 
pragmatic consequences of the combination of that and same in a DP. It may be signif-
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I carried out a test in which 25 not linguistically trained speakers of 
English volunteered to read B’s disjunctive reactions to A’s statement in 
the talk exchanges presented in (18) B1-4 below, each with two alterna-
tive verbal reactions from speaker B, an a-version with the comparison 
phrase as Peter and a b-version without it. The stimuli were presented 
on a computer screen in the same form as (18) below. I was present in 
the room, and I asked each participant individually if they felt that B’s 
continuation in the form of a but-conjunct occurring in each of B’s list of 
stimuli was coherent/relevant or incoherent/irrelevant in the context of A’s 
statement and the first of B’s coordinate sentences. I also asked them 
to paraphrase the but-conjunct in each case, so as to give me an idea of 
what they took the second part of B’s utterance to mean. All commu-
nication between me and the respondents was oral. They were offered 
the stipulation that Peter and Penny were simultaneous hotel residents; 
otherwise no contextual constraints were imposed on their evaluation 
task. My physical presence gave me an opportunity to discuss the data 
with respondents who felt like it when the test was completed12. 
(18) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.
 B1a: Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, but it had a different 
name.
 B1b: Penny was staying in the same hotel, but it had a different name.
 B2a: Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, but it wasn’t Hotel 
Excelsior.
 B2b: Penny was staying in the same hotel, but it wasn’t Hotel Excelsior.
 B3a: Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, but it wasn’t that hotel.
 B3b: Penny was staying in the same hotel, but it wasn’t that hotel.
 B4a: Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, but Peter didn’t stay 
there.
 B4b: Penny was staying in the same hotel, but Peter didn’t stay there. 
icant, though, that there is no expression *that same hotel as Peter. The discussion in 
the present section will hopefully shed some light on this issue. 
12 I have some ideas as to how the design of my test could be changed and effectively 
improved, but that, unfortunately, belongs to a different paper, one in which the stimuli 
are spoken utterances presented one at a time and in a random order. An anonymous re-
viewer said that a more elaborate, properly controlled psycholingistic study would need 
to be carried before one could state conclusively that same has the lexical semantics and 
the pragmatic consequences that I attribute to the word.
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When dealing with (18) B1a and B1b, the 25 participants responded 
univocally that they understood speaker B to be making the point that 
the name of the hotel selected by A is incorrect, but some of them sug-
gested that B may be able to infer which hotel A is referring to even if 
A got the name wrong. Thus, A and B were understood to agree about 
the referent, the Fregean Bedeutung (Frege 1892), of A’s name, but B 
objects to A’s “mode of presentation” of the reference, the Fregean Sinn 
(Frege ibid), or Kaplan’s “character” (Kaplan 1989). 
In hindsight, I can see that the pair of B1a-b should not have been 
included in my set of stimuli at all. The hotel name issue introduced 
explicitly in B1 probably had an impact on the respondents’ reactions 
to the next pair (B2a-b) that was unfortunate. I must admit that I was at 
first surprised to find that the conjunct (but) it wasn’t Hotel Excelsior 
in B2a-b was uniformly understood in the same way as (but) it had a 
different name in B1a-b. The co-presence of the pair of B1a-b among the 
set of stimuli was probably responsible for the consistency of their re-
actions to B2a-b. Once again, everyone understood the issue to be the 
name of hotel, not the hotel itself. It is conceivable that this partly hap-
pened because they felt the but-conjunct would otherwise contradict 
the explicitly communicated content, or explicature (Sperber & Wilson 
1986/1995; Carston 2002), of B’s preceding conjunct Penny was stay-
ing in the same hotel (as Peter), but the respondents’ attention to the 
first pair of stimuli that tells us directly that A got the name of the hotel 
wrong may have been an important impetus to the uniform judgment of 
B2a-b, an unintended trigger that I should have foreseen. 
If the debate in the different talk exchanges in (18) is just over the 
name, then we do not have to worry about whether the referent of the 
proper name employed by A is the same as what is designated by B’s 
definite descriptions. However, if the pronoun it in (18) B2a-2b is meant 
to refer to the hotel rather than to its name, then the claim that it is not 
Hotel Excelsior would be coherent just in case the terms the same hotel 
as Peter in (18) B2a and the same hotel in (18) B2b designate a different 
hotel than the one A referred to. However, no respondent accessed the 
thought that B was talking about a hotel which was not Hotel Excelsior. 
As I said, I consider it highly plausible that their belief that B’s nega-
tive statement in (18) B2 concerns the name of the hotel may (at least 
for some respondents) be a consequence of their having first read and 
interpreted (18) B1a-1b. 
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The respondents’ reactions to (18) B1a-1b and (18) B2a-2b do not sup-
port the thought that they may have understood the reference of the 
longer DP the same hotel as Peter differently than the reference of 
the shorter DP the same hotel. After all, why should it be a legitimate 
thought that they would be interpreted differently? Is it not to be ex-
pected that the respondents would read the description without the as-
phrase as a less explicit linguistic vehicle than the description with the 
as-phrase, yet one that is truth-conditionally equivalent to the longer 
form? Depending on one’s theoretical preferences, one might postulate 
a syntactic complement of the same hotel that includes a term with 
the function of a zero anaphor, an indexical with no segmental form. 
The most accessible discourse antecedent of this zero anaphor would 
be one that causes the addressee to equate the denotations of the same 
hotel as Peter and the same hotel, making Penny and Peter the com-
pared arguments of the similitude predicate in either case: [the hotel in 
which Penny was staying]Arg1 is the SAME as [the hotel in which Peter 
was staying]Arg2. Alternatively, one could be a radical contextualist who 
believes in massive linguistic underdetermination of propositional con-
tent and disavows the Isomorphism Principle (footnote 2), including 
the claim that quite a few apparently missing syntactic elements are 
syntactically real zero items. 
My position is that the presence of the word same is sufficient to 
trigger the addressee’s context-dependent search for the other argument 
of the two-place predicate when it is not overtly expressed but has to be 
retrieved contextually. No other linguistic cue is needed in the DP, so 
we should not postulate any. The presence of same makes the putative 
job of a postulated zero anaphor in the DP redundant.
When encountering (18) B3a-3b and (18) B4a-4b, the respondents’ in-
terpretations were no longer muddled by the proper name issue. Let 
us first compare B3a with the DP the same hotel as Peter and B3b with 
the DP the same hotel, followed by the negative statement it wasn’t 
that hotel. Regardless of whether the description contains the compar-
ison phrase as Peter or lacks that phrase, the entity designated by B’s 
pronoun it is bound to be a hotel, as opposed to the name of a hotel. 
The respondents’ reactions revealed that most of them failed to detect 
any relevant interpretation of B’s coordination of declaratives at all, 
whether or not the DP contained the complement as Peter. The majority 
spotted an internal inconsistency in the longer (18) B3a and the shorter 
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(18) B3b alike. For those people, there was a confusing step from the 
first to the second conjunct of B’s utterance. B’s negative statement was 
found to be incoherent in the context they had accessed. This came as 
no surprise to me.
One of the reviewers of this paper found B3b difficult to process, 
but judged it to be coherent and to mean the same as B3a. According to 
this reviewer, B is in each case both correcting A (with regard to A’s 
belief that the hotel was Excelsior or that it was named Excelsior) and 
at the same time saying that Penny stayed in the same hotel as Peter. 
Robyn Carston (p.c.) told me she got the impression that, although B3a 
is longer than B3b, it may be that B3a costs less processing effort in the 
end for some (including her). In the case of B3b, she found herself more 
likely to take the reference of the same hotel to be Hotel Excelsior and 
to persist with that referent so that, by the time she got to the end of B’s 
utterance, she was faced with a contradiction and had to go back and 
try to find another interpretation. That was much harder in B3b, she said, 
than in B3a whose DP mentions Peter and opens for the possibility that 
Peter and Penny not only were in the same hotel but even that this hotel 
was not the one A referred to. I second Carston’s feeling that B3a makes 
better sense than B3b because the added phrase as Peter makes it easier 
to activate the thought that Peter and Penny were not staying in Hotel 
Excelsior. 
What, then, did the participants in the comprehension test actually 
say about (18) B3a-3b? 17/25 evaluations of (18) B3a (Penny was staying 
in the same hotel as Peter, but it wasn’t that hotel) supported the con-
clusion that B’s negative statement is incoherent in the context offered 
by A’s utterance and B’s first conjunct clause. A minority group of 8/25 
respondents judged the but-conjunct in (18) B3a to be meaningful, of-
fering me paraphrases which entailed that Penny and Peter were not 
staying in Hotel Excelsior but in a different hotel. As for (18) B3b with 
the shorter DP (Penny was staying in the same hotel, but it wasn’t that 
hotel), as many as 23/25 dismissed the but-conjunct because it was felt 
to be incoherent, contradictory, or unintelligible. Just 2/25 respondents 
said the but-conjunct was coherent. This outcome suggests that, once 
you are forced to lay aside the hypothesis that B’s negative statement 
concerns the name of the hotel, it does matter whether or not there is an 
as-phrase in B’s description. The pattern of responses to (18) B3a and B3b 
informs us that these are far from optimally relevant stimuli, the former 
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because the respondents were divided in their judgments of whether 
or not the but-conjunct is coherent, the latter because nearly everyone 
dismissed it as incoherent. 
In principle, the term the same hotel in B3a-b admits of two prag-
matic enrichments that are of interest to me, on the one hand ʻthe ho-
tel at which Peter was staying’, on the other hand ʻthe hotel that A is 
referring to’. These are two different senses, potentially matching two 
distinct referents. The former enrichment is consistent with the assump-
tion that Penny and Peter were staying in Hotel Excelsior as well as the 
assumption that they were staying somewhere else. In contrast to this, 
the enrichment ʻthe hotel that A is referring to’ is only consistent with 
the assumption that Penny and Peter were staying in Hotel Excelsior, an 
assumption contradicted by the content of the second conjunct whose 
referential term that hotel clearly refers to Hotel Excelsior. When the 
description contains the as-phrase, the choice between two competing 
enrichments and the higher degree of accessibility of the alternative 
ʻthe hotel at which Peter was staying’ may have contributed to the fact 
that at least a minority number of 8/25 responses linked the same hotel 
as Peter to a hotel at which Penny and Peter were both guests, one 
that was not Hotel Excelsior according to the information in the sec-
ond conjunct clause. It was evidently harder to reconcile the shorter DP 
with the thought that they were not staying in Hotel Excelsior, although 
only that would have made the but-conjunct relevant. The reason for 
the respondents’ problem with B3b is undoubtedly the fact that there is 
no overt verbal mention of Peter in B3b, in contrast to B3a. Omission of 
the phrase as Peter reduces the relevance of the stimulus considerably 
if the speaker intends the referent of the same hotel to be the hotel at 
which Peter was staying. Even B3a with the as-phrase apparently con-
fused a majority of the respondents. This was probably because the DP 
the same hotel as Peter in the first conjunct and the DP that hotel in the 
second conjunct appear at first glance to be coreferential, an impression 
that proves untenable. The situation gets worse when there is no as-
phrase in the first conjunct. Then it is comparatively harder to refrain 
from enriching the DP as ʻthe hotel that A is referring to’, an analysis 
that leads to an impasse because it is contradicted by the information in 
the second conjunct.
Faced with the last two talk exchanges in (18), A’s statement fol-
lowed by (18) B4a (Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, but 
Thorstein Fretheim218
Peter didn’t stay there) was rejected by 21/25 respondents, only 4/25 
accepted it. When the DP did not contain the as-phrase, in (18) B4b 
(Penny was staying in the same hotel, but Peter didn’t stay there), an in-
creased number of respondents accepted B’s correction as meaningful. 
7/25 selected an interpretation of (18) B4b which implied that Penny was 
a resident of Hotel Excelsior but Peter was not, while 18/25 dismissed 
B’s but-conjunct in (18) B4b as contradictory. Compared to the group’s 
reactions to (18) B3b on the one hand and (18) B4a on the other, there was 
a moderate swing from rejection to acceptance of B’s negative state-
ment in (18) B4b. 
One respondent made an interesting observation. If we assume that 
the anaphoric pro-adverb there is unstressed in (18) B4a, the content of 
the second conjunct does contradict the content of the first conjunct. 
But things may change, this person said, if one imagines that speaker B 
produces an utterance of (18) B4a with an anaphoric indexical there that 
has contrastive accent: but Peter didn’t stay THERE. Then the referent 
of there could possibly be Hotel Excelsior, while the earlier term the 
same hotel as Peter would designate the hotel where Peter and Pen-
ny were both staying. True enough, contrastive accentuation of there 
may be interpreted as an indicator that the addressee should bypass the 
nearest candidate antecedent (cf. Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski 1993), 
i.e. the PrepP in the same hotel as Peter, and select one that such pro-
sodic handling of there makes more accessible, i.e. the PrepP in Hotel 
Excelsior in A’s utterance. Personally I feel that the relevance of both 
(18) B4a and (18) B4b is dependent on the presence of a contrastive pitch 
accent on there. Letting the nuclear accent fall on there, at the expense 
of any one of the preceding word forms Peter, didn’t or stay, is a way 
of indicating that Peter and Penny were both staying in a hotel that was 
not the Excelsior. The alert test subject’s ideas about the significance of 
B’s prosodic handling of there applied to (18) B4a only, not to (18) B4b, 
whose shorter phrase in the same hotel makes no mention of Peter. He 
did not tell me why he did not extend the same analysis to (18) B4b, and 
I decided not to press him on that point. 
(19) and (20) were not incorporated in my set of test data, natural-
ly. (19) B and (20) B are impeccable denials of the belief that Peter 
was staying in Hotel Excelsior. They reduce the addressee’s processing 
cost consideraby compared to the alternative form of (18) B4b. The only 
reading of (18) B4b that was accepted by some respondents was one that 
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made that stimulus truth-conditionally equivalent to (19) B/(20) B, but 
while most evaluations of (18) B4b were negative, the content of (19) B 
or (20) B is crystal clear. 
(19) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.
 B: Penny was staying in Hotel Excelsior, but Peter didn’t stay there. 
(20) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.
 B: Penny was staying in that hotel, but Peter didn’t stay there.
In contrast to the name Hotel Excelsior in (19) B and the descrip-
tion that hotel in (20) B, the descriptive DP the same hotel does not 
refer to a particular object. The people who understood (18) B4b in the 
same way that any speaker of English will understand (19) B or (20) 
B must have chosen a pragmatic enrichment of the same hotel that 
does not involve Peter as the other argument of the similarity predicate. 
This means that their enrichment yielded a propositional form for the 
first conjunct that is paraphrasable as ʻPenny was staying in the hotel 
that A is referring to’, which implies that Penny was staying in Hotel 
Excelsior. The alternative enrichment ʻPenny was staying in the same 
hotel as Peter’ is contradicted by the negation in the following but-con-
junct. Even though it led to contradiction, that must nevertheless have 
been the reading chosen by the majority. A pragmatic interpretation 
that would have made the stimulus of (18) B4b meaningful involves 
expenditure of so much mental processing work that many participants 
were forced to give up deriving a content for B’s first conjunct that was 
not contradicted by B’s second conjunct. In addition, the as-phrase in 
(18) B4a seems to reduce the relevance of that utterance even more, be-
cause the as-phrase tells us explicitly that Penny and Peter were staying 
in the same hotel, the consequence being that the interpreter has to find 
an antecedent for the adverb there which is not expressed in B’s first 
conjunct, or else conclude that what B is saying does not make sense. 
An alternative analysis in the case of (18) B4b would be to call the 
same hotel a description that is used to refer directly to Hotel Excelsior, 
but in my opinion the grammatical deviance of (21) B1 and B2 indicates 
that there is no coreference relation between Hotel Excelsior in A’s ut-
terance and the same hotel in B’s disjunctive utterances. The additive 
focus marker as well, or also, would not be a fully acceptable addition 
to B’s reaction to A’s statement. 
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(21) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.
 B1: 
?Penny was staying in the same hotel as well. 
 B2: 
?Penny was also staying in the same hotel.
As well (or too) and also indicate that the content of A’s and B’s 
predicate phrases is the same, which implies that the denotation of the 
nominals employed by the two interactants is the same. This condition 
is satisfied in (22) B1 and B2, but not in (21) B1 and B2.
(22) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.
 B1: Penny was staying in that hotel as well.
 B2: Penny was also staying in Hotel Excelsior. 
As well in (22) B1 and also in (22) B2 are not simply redundant ex-
pressions of a semantic equivalence between the predicate phrases of 
the interactants. If we delete these focus markers and furnish the sub-
ject argument Penny with a contrastive accent, it is an open question 
whether B endorses the explicature communicated by A. (23) B1 and 
B2 are utterances whose relevance may depend partly on the speak-
er’s implicitly denouncing the proposition expressed by A. B shares A’s 
propositional attitude in (22) but does so only contingently in (23), and 
rejects it in case it is mutually manifest that Penny was not in the same 
place as Peter.
(23) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.
 B1: PENNY was staying in that hotel.
 B2: PENNY was staying in Hotel Excelsior.
That the whole predicate phrase in (23) B1–B2 is treated prosodically 
as a post-nuclear domain with no pitch accent indicates that the terms 
that hotel in B1 and Hotel Excelsior in B2 represent referentially given 
entities. The accentual pattern indicated in (23) B1–B2 is less suitable 
if we let the same hotel substitute for the description in (23) B1 or the 
proper name in (23) B2, because B’s DP the same hotel in (24) is not 
coreferential with Hotel Excelsior in (23).
(24) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.
 B: ?PENNY was staying in the same hotel.
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4. Conclusion
An indexical of the pronominal sort cannot survive as indexical in the 
mental representation of the propositional content of an utterance. By 
virtue of its procedural meaning, an anaphoric pronoun causes the in-
terlocutor to identify a discourse antecedent that will saturate it through 
an inference-based process of activating in the interlocutor’s mind in-
formation that supplies, as a truth condition, the intended referent of the 
pronoun. Referentially used definite descriptions play a similar role. The 
concepts that those nominals encode are not supplied to the truth-con-
ditional semantics of an utterance. Instead, they are endowed with pro-
cedural meaning that constrains the interlocutor’s inference needed to 
identify the referent of the nominal13. Thus, a definite description like 
the hotel you’re mentioning or a complex demonstrative like that hotel 
could refer to a unique hotel. In my set of data, DPs like these could 
refer directly to Hotel Excelsior even if no concept expressed by these 
descriptions is a logical constituent of the explicature of B’s response to 
A’s statement about Peter. That hotel would refer to Hotel Excelsior by 
virtue of the procedural semantics of the demonstrative determiner that, 
while phrases like the hotel you’re mentioning or Peter’s hotel do so by 
directing the attention of B’s conversational partner A to a referent cor-
rectly described as a uniquely identifiable hotel mentioned by A in the 
former case and a hotel where Peter was a guest in the latter case. A DP 
like the hotel you’re mentioning or the man I told you about can refer 
back to a unique entity similar to the way that indexical expressions that 
encode no concept are vehicles of direct reference. 
Adding the determiner same to an English definite description 
means that the DP loses its ability to function like a term that enables 
the addressee to pick out a unique discourse-activated referent. One 
should not draw the conclusion that the expressions the same hotel and 
the same hotel as Peter are DPs that refer directly to Hotel Excelsior 
if context permits. The hypothesis that the determiner same blocks a 
directly referential reading of the DP is vindicated, both when same is 
13 Fretheim (2011) argues that the conceptual meaning of a referentially used definite 
description can also direct the hearer to information that goes beyond truth-conditional 
content, for example information opening for activation of contextual premises that will 
increase the overall relevance of a linguistic stimulus. This is information that is not 
provided by anaphora of the indexical type.
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not accompanied by an as-phrase referring to a discourse-given entity 
and when the DP does contain an as-phrase. Due to the presence of the 
lexical item same, a DP like the same hotel as Peter should be interpret-
ed as a non-referential term. This implies that the identity marker same, 
the common noun hotel and the proper name Peter are all linguistic 
ingredients entered into the speaker’s propositional content. The DP the 
same hotel without the comparison phrase is also non-referential. When 
there is no overt mention of Peter, the other part in the similitude rela-
tion will be correctly recognized as Peter if that pragmatic enrichment 
of the encoded logical form of the sentence makes the stimulus relevant 
for the interpreter. Otherwise some other enrichment is required, and if 
no other enrichment is accessible to the interpreter, there is a very real 
risk that no relevant mental representation of the stimulus will be found. 
In some of the talk exchanges, the explicature of B’s second declarative 
will then be felt to contradict the explicature of the declarative preced-
ing the adversative connective but. 
Neither the longer DP the same hotel as Peter nor the shorter DP the 
same hotel is an optimally relevant term in the set of stimuli constitut-
ing the test data presented and discussed in section 3. The respondents’ 
judgments of coherence or incoherence support the far from astonishing 
fact that B’s choice of linguistic structure in the first of the two conjunct 
clauses is not the best linguistic choice if B’s intention is to let the DP 
refer to Hotel Excelsior, a referent introduced by speaker A. Nor are 
these DPs successful if B’s intention is to express the information that 
Peter and Penny were staying in a different hotel than Hotel Excelsior. 
Peculiar to the DP the same hotel without the as-phrase complement 
is the fact that it allows for a choice between two different pragmatic 
enrichments of the encoded logical form, either the hotel where Peter 
was staying or the hotel referred to by A. These two senses are mutually 
exclusive in some of B’s stimuli in (18). The similitude marker same is 
redundant in the term the same hotel that A is referring to but certainly 
not in the same hotel as Peter. This may be one reason why an enrich-
ment of the same hotel that represents the hotel referred to by speaker A 
is not as accessible, ceteris paribus, as its rival interpretation, the hotel 
where Peter was staying. Some respondents may not have been willing 
to spend the extra effort needed to reconcile the content of B’s first con-
junct with the content of B’s second conjunct, so their verdict is that B’s 
but-conjunct expresses a self-contradiction, a much simpler egress in a 
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potentially stressful test situation. Faced with (18) B3b and B4b, a rele-
vant interpretation of those stimuli would have been obtainable if they 
had been able to access the alternative enrichment ʻthe (same) hotel 
that A is referring to’ without a disproportionate expenditure of mental 
effort. 
I have said that the tendency to associate the same hotel as Peter 
and even more so the same hotel with the singular referent Hotel Ex-
celsior is not that speaker B is using these DPs to refer to Hotel Excel-
sior, though some of the test stimuli may have directed the addressee to 
the implicated conclusion that Penny and Peter were staying in Hotel 
Excelsior. The venerable cancelability test for conversational implica-
ture (Grice 1989) seems to open for the possibility that the implicature 
ʻPenny and Peter were staying in Hotel Excelsior’ is canceled when the 
content of B’s negative statement in B4 (Peter didn’t stay there) appears 
to contradict it. The explicated information that Penny was staying in 
the same hotel as Peter would then direct the addressee to the inference 
that their hotel was not Hotel Excelsior, and to a comprehension of the 
but-conjunct as a legitimate objection to A’s claim about Peter. This 
arguably involves a lot more processing effort than the competing judg-
ment that B’s but-conjunct contradicts the proposition expressed by B’s 
previous conjunct. In order to activate a relevant interpretation, the re-
spondents would have to bypass B’s first conjunct in their search for the 
antecedent of the anaphor that (of that hotel) in B3 and of there in B4, 
and to establish a coreference relation between these indexicals and A’s 
proper name Hotel Excelsior instead. Their incoherence judgment was 
moreover supported by my having told them to judge the but-conjunct 
to be either coherent or incoherent, an important contextual clue. The 
information that the but-conjunct could potentially be incoherent may 
have caused some to opt for the least effortful result of their attempts to 
come to grips with B3a-3b and B4a-4b. 
According to Russell (1905), the sentence The present King of 
France is bald expresses a true proposition iff there is at most one thing 
which is currently King of France and bald, but since nothing is current-
ly King of France, the proposition expressed by that famous sentence 
is false. Strawson (1950) objected to Russell’s analysis, arguing that 
since nothing fits the description the present King of France, the prop-
osition is not false, there is simply a failure of reference in that subject 
phrase. Donnellan (1966) pointed to weaknesses both in Russell’s and 
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Strawson’s accounts. There are two different uses of definite descrip-
tions, he said: referential and non-referential (or attributive in his own 
terminology). Smith’s murderer in the sentence Smith’s murderer is in-
sane is used non-referentially if the speaker’s meaning is that Smith’s 
murderer, whoever he is, is an insane person (because of what he did). 
Smith’s murderer is used referentially if it is a description that is meant 
to enable the addressee to identify a particular individual as the referent 
of the term, say someone called Jones. Donnellan’s distinction has not 
gained universal acceptance among philosophers and linguists. I have 
tried to demonstrate that the word same in a description means that it 
can only be given a non-referential reading. In my opinion, the exist-
ence of a word with those semantic properties in the lexicon of English 
(and the existence of equivalent words in other languages) supports the 
view that Donnellan’s distinction is fruitful even for practitioners of 
linguistic pragmatics. 
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